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AuTOLoBuns-ToRTs--NoN-REGISTRwTIoN OF CAn As BAn TO BECOVEnY
Fon DAGrcs.-The plaintiff's unregistered truck collided with a train of the
defendant railway on a private railroad crossing, situated 500 feet from the
public highway, and reached by way of a private road. In a subsequent ac-
tion for damages the plaintiff was nonsuited on the ground that the action
was barred by a statute providing that 'No recovery shall be had .. , by the
owner of a motor vehicle which has not been legally registered . .. , for
injury to person or property received by reason of the operation of such
motor vehicles upon any public highway' [Conn. Pub. Acts 1921, c. 400, §
61] Held, on appeal, that the judgment be reversed. Byrolig T~an.porta-
tion Co. v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R., 147 At. 512 (Conn. 1929).
The Connecticut court, in accord with the rule in most jurisdictions,
early refused to bar a recovery for negligent injury to an unregistered
motor vehicle on the sole ground of nonregistration. Homming v. City of
New Haven, 82 Conn. 661, 74 Atl. 892 (1910); (1920) 18 MICH. L. Rev.
234. But a few courts, notably Massachusetts, have consistently hold to
the contrary, under statutes prohibiting the operation of unregistered
machines. Nichols v. Holyole Street Ry., 250 lass. 88, 145 IT. E. 33
(1924); (1919) 19 COL. L. R v. 408; (1922) 7 MIWNN. L. REV. 68. The pres-
ent Connecticut statute, in barring a recovery by the owner of an unregis-
tered car, epressly adopts the rule of these latter jurisdictions. Comment
(1922) 32 YAME L. 3. 394. But the; Connecticut court has strictly limited
the operation of the statute. Thus, it has held that an unregistered motor
truck which was being "towed" was not being "operated" within the mean-
ing of the statute. Dewhirst v. Connecticut Co., 96 Conn. 389, 114 Ati.
1.00 (1921). But cf. Stroud v. Board of Water Cone"rs of Hartford, 90
Conn. 412, 97 AtL 336 (1916). The court has also allowed a recovery by
the owner of a machine which, although registered, carried improper
markers in violation of the statute. Bohman a. Perrott, 97 Conn. 571,
118 Ati. 42 (1922). But cf. Fahey v. Melrose, 205 Mass. 329, 91 N. E. 306
(1910). And it has refused to bar an action by an owner who had deliv-
ered his unregistered automobile to a dealer to be sold, which dealer in
turn allowed the owner to operate the car until the sale was made, on the
theory that the owner merely "borrowed" the car and could therefore oper-
ate it under the dealer's general registration. Slaw v. Connecticut C&.,.
86 Conn. 409, 85 Atl. 536 (1912). But see Cobb v. Cumberland Co. P. & L.
Co., 117 Me. 455, 456, 104 Atl. 844, 845 (1918). Nor are passengers of
unregistered automobiles denied a right of action in Connecticut on the
ground of non-registration, as they are in jurisdictions following the Massa-
chusetts rule. Levine v. RHegeman Transfer & Light Term, 100 Conn. 122,
123 AtI. 19 (1923) ; Wise v. Berger, 103 Conn. 29, 130 AtI. '76 (1925). But
cf. Dean v. Boston, Elevated By., 217 Mass. 495, 105 NT. E. 616 (1914);
Wentzell v. Boston Elevated By., 230 Mass. 275, 119 N. E. 652 (1918). In
holding the statute inapplicable in the instant case, on the ground that the
truck was not on a "public highway" at the time of the collision, the court
further limited the statute. In view of the consistent attitude of the court
and the criticism generally directed at the minority rule, the Legislature
might well consider repealing the statute. See (1924) 38 HAt. L. Ruv. 531.
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BANKS AND BANKING-EQUITABLE ASSIGNMENTS--DEPOSITS FOR A SPE-
ciFic PunPosm.--Under a loan arrangement, the defendant bank placed funds
to the credit of S for the purpose of meeting checks to be drawn by him in
the purchase of cotton. S drew checks in payment for cotton purchased
under cash sales from planters. He resold to the plaintiffs, who paid by
check, the defendant bank collecting and holding the proceeds. The planters
then presented the checks .drawn ,by S, but payment was refused. The
planters brought a statutory trover action against the plaintiffs. The plain-
tiffs then brought this bill in equity to enjoin the trover suits, and to estab-
lish the primary responsibility in the .defendant bank. The court below sus-
tained the demurrer of the bank. Held, on appeal, that since the plaintiffs
might be held responsible in the trover suits the bank held the proceeds of
their checks impressed with a trust in their favor, and should be held pri-
marily responsible to pay the planters' claims. Judgment reversed. Manget
v. National City Bank, 149 S. E. 213 (Ga. 1929).
Under § 189 of the Negotiable Instruments Law a check of itself does not
operate as a pro tanto assignment of the drawer's funds. BRANNON, No-
TIABM INSTRUDIENT S LAiv (4th ed. 1926). § 189. A few courts have regarded
this section asintended only for the benefit of the drawee. Farrington 'V.
Fleming Com. Co., 94 Neb. 108, 142 N. W. 297 (1913) (garnishment of
drawer's deposit not allowed as against payee of previously issued check).
Most courts, however, regard it as applicable although the drawee would
not be injured if an assignment were upheld. Leach v. "techanios Sav.
Bank, 202 Iowa 899, 211 N. W. 506 (1926) (holdei of check not allowed pay-
ment from drawer's bank account as against drawer's receiver); Comment
(1928) 37 YALr I. T. 626, 627. The effect of an assignment has been al-
lowed where special circumstances exist showing such an intention. Cf.
Fourth, St Bank v. Yardley, 165 U. S. 634 (1897) ; Aigler, Rights of Holder
of Bill Against Drawee (1925) 38 HARv. L. REV. 857, 859. But in the trans-
mission of credit cases, the receiver o'f the depository has prevailed as
against both the depositor and the beneficiary of the deposit, although the
intention to appropriate the fund to the payment of the draft would seem
apparent. Equitable Trust Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 275 U. S. 359, 48 Sup.
Ct. 167 (1928) ; First Nat. Bank v. State Bank, 110 Ore. 601, 222 Pac. 1079
(1924).; Wrightsvile & T. R. Co. v. Citizens & So. Nat. Bank, 36 V. (2d)
736 (C. C. A. 5th, 1929); (1924) 33 YArM L. J. 888. In a similar situation,
wherei a collecting bank draws a remittance draft on its deposit in a third
bank, some courts have, however, allowed the payee bank a preferred claim,
on assignment principles, upon the insolvency of the remitting bank. Mes-
senger -v. Carroll Trust & Sav. Bank, 193 Iowa 608, 187 N. W. 545 (1922) ;
Federal Reserv' Bank v. Peters, 139 Va. 45, 123 S. E. 379 (1924) ; Thoas,
v. Mothersead, 128 Okla. 157, 261 Pac. 363 (1927). Contra: Odle v. Barnes,
117 Tex. 174, 299 S. W. 635 (1927). Where the drawee bank had notice that
the deposit was for a specific purpose, it has been disallowed a set-off of a
debt owed to it by the depositor as against payees of checks given in accord-
ance with the purpose. Payne . Burnett, 151 Tenn. 496, 269 S. W. 27, 89 A.
L. R. 1125 (1925) ; Cable v. Iowa State Savings Bank, 197 Iowa 393, 194 N.
W. 957 (1923). Garnishment of such deposit has been disallowed as against
such payees. First Nat. Bank v. Propp, 198 Iowa 809, 200 N. W. 428
(1924). Such payees have recovered against a bank which permitted the
deposit to be witidrawn by paying other checks. Morton v. Woolery, 48
N. D. 1132, 189 N. W. 232, 24 A. L. R. 1107 (1922). These decisions, rested
on grounds of "equitable assignments," "trusts," and "deposits for a specific
purpose," grow out of situations having substantially similar characteristics.
But whether the bank of deposit incurs any responsibility seems to depend
upon notice to it of the circumstances. The use of these categories, however,
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should not be controlling on the question of a preferred claim against the
depository upon insolvency. Cf. Note ,(1928) 13 CoRw. L. Q. 603. But of.
Whitman va. Bragg & Co., Inc., 30 F. (2d) 136 (C. C. A. 5th, 1929).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-POLICn PowER-E=AGU TION OF CHARITABLE COL-
LECTIoN AaNcY.-The defendant was convicted under a statute 'which made
it unlawful for any person, copartnership, association, or corporation to
solicit money for charitable purposes 'without a license. It provided that
an applicant for a license should file -with the Department of Public Wel-
fare such information as the Department might require; that the Depart-
ment might hold such hearings as it considered necessary; and that if the
Department deemed the agency "a proper one, and not inimical to the public
welfare, or safety," it should issue the license. Certain named organiza-
tions were -exempted from the statute. fPA. STAT. (Supp. 1928) § 2637
(a, 1) et seg.] The defendant contended that the exemptions rendered the
statute unconstitutional. Held, on appeal, that the conviction be affirmed.
Co m nwealthk. McDermott, 296 Pa. 299, 145 AtI 858 (1929).
This case does not involve the question whether a charitable collection
agency is a "business affected with a public interest," for even though a
business is "private," engaging in it 'without a license may be prohibited.
Brazee v. Michigan, 241 U. S. 340, 36 Sup. Ct. 561 (1916); Weller -u. New
York, 268 U. S. 319, 45 Sup. Ct. 556 (1925). But of. TVson, -v Banton, 273
U. S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426 (1927) ; Ribnil v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350, 48
Sup. Ct. 545 (1928); Comment (1928) 38 YALE L. J. 225. But the licensing
authorities may not be given arbitrary power to grant or refuse a license
without regard to the qualifications of the applicant. YeT Wo a. Hopkina,
118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. 1068 (1886). And before the license is refused, the
applicant must be given an opportunity to be heard. See Intorstate Comm.
Comm. v. Louis'oe & N. R. R, 227 U. S. 88, 91, 33 Sup. Ct 185, 186 (1913).
The courts have sustained many statutes analogous to the one in the instant
case in that they were designed to protect the public against imposition and
fraud. Hall -v. Gaiger-Joned Co., 242 U. S. 539, 37 Sup. Ct 217, L. IL A.
1917F 514 (1917) ("Blue Sky Laws"); Hammr v. State 173 Ind. 199, 89
N. E. 850 (1909) (forbidding non-members of secret society to -wear its
badge) ; State v,. Rose, 122 So. 225 (Fla. 1929) (licensing real estate brol-ers
and salesmen); M Masters -v. State, 21 Okla. Cr. R. 318, 207 Pae. 566, 29
A. L. R. 292 (1922) (prohibiting professional palmistry and mediumship);
Emert v. Missour4 156 U. S. 296, 15 Sup. Ct.- 367 (1895) (licensing ped-
dlers) ; see FREUND, PoLwcE Powm (1904) c. 1l. Such regulation is not
confined to occupations which may be considered naturally or generally to
involve or encourage fraud (e.g., "book-micing"); it may e.'-tend to those
where fraud is only, occasional, but 'where there is nevertheless an oppor-
tunity for fraudulent practice. Mlerrck, v. Halscy & Co., 242 U. S. 568, 37
Sup. Ct. 227 (1917). Several states have enacted statutes similar to the
one under discussion, some of them being almost identical, and their con-
stitutionality seems never to have been questioned. ME. BRnv. STAT. (1916)
c. 147, § 5; CAL. CoDEs and GEN. LAws (Deering, Consol. Supp. 1917-1919)
tit. 95, act 576, p. 881; KAN. RBu. STAT. ANN. (1923) c. 17, art. 17, §§
1706-10; GA. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1926) tit. 22, § 2158 (82); IOWA CODE
(1927) c. 93, § 1921 (b, 1) etseq.; Ky. Acts 1928, c. 16, § 32. In view of the
frequency with -which fraudulent "charities" victimize the public, such reg-
ulation seems reasonable and proper. The regulation itself being reasonable,
a reasonable exemaption from it will not render it unconstitutional. New
York v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63, 49 Sup. Ct. 61 (1928).
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CONTRACTS-MO'RTGAGES -ASSUMPTION OF DEBT BY GRANTEE WHERE PRIOR
OwNER HAD NOT AssumE.-The defendant, a grantee of mortgaged land,
promised in part consideration for the grant to pay the mortgage debt. In
a suit by the mortgagee for the debt, the defendant set up that a prior
owner subject to the mortgage had not assumed the debt. The trial court
gave judgment for the defendant. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be
reversed, since the right of the plaintiff to recover as a third party benefici-
ary was not dependant upon an unbroken chain of assumptions by prior
grantees. Schneider v. Ferrigno, 147 Atl. 303 (Conn. 1929).
It is well settled that a mortgagee may recover as a third party bene-
ficiary from a grantee who has assumed the mortgage debt where the
grantor and prior owners were personally responsible for the debt. Smith
v. Kibbe, 104 Kan. 159, 178 Pac. 427 (1919); Williston, Contracts for tiw
Benefit of a Third Per.son (1902) 15 HAuv. L. R v. 767, 808. Many courts,
in accord with the instant case, allow a recovery even though the grantor
was not personally responsible. Allen v. Traylor, 212 S. W. 945 (Tex.
1919); Cobb v. Fishel, 15 Colo. App. 384, 62 Pac. 625 (1900); 2 JONES,
MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) 326, n. 81. Contra: FTy . Ausman, 29 S. D. 30,
135 N. W. 708 (1912) ; JONEs, op. cit. supra. at 325, n. 77; of. Goodeoough v.
Labrie, 206 Mass. 599, 92 N. . 07- (1910). The rule of the instant case
has been disapproved by commentators on grounds of legal theory. Thus,
it is urged that the mortgagee cannot recover as a "creditor beneficiary"
since the grantor did not personally owe the debt. Note (1923) 9 CORN. L.
Q. 213. And it is further claimed that recovery "as a donee beneficiary" is
unsound since the probable motive of the grantor in requiring the promise
was not to benefit the mortgagee but to protect himself against a supposed
personal responsibility. 1 WzLiLsToN, CONTRACTS (1920) § 386; Note (1923)
9 CoRN. L. Q. 213. But while it may be conceded that under the present
facts the mortgagee does not qualify strictly ag a "creditor" or a "donee"
beneficiary, it would seem that the factual relationship of the grantor to the
mortgagee is so similar to that existing in the creditor beneficiary situation
that the same reasons for a recovery exist. The denial of recovery in some
of the early cases is based upon the inapplicability of the doctrine of sub-
rogation. Cf. Vroonwan v. Turner, 69 N. Y. 280 (1887). But while it may
be said that a creditor is subrogated" to the remedies of his debtor against
one who has contracted to pay the debt, the recovery in many creditor bene-
ficiary contracts has not been put upon this ground. Cf. Lawrence v. Fox,
20 N. Y. 268 (1859). Hence the fact that this theory is not applicable to
the present facts would seem to be an insufficient reason for denying a re-
covery. ANSON, CONTRACTS (Corbin's ed. 1924) § 290. The principal ques-
tion would appear to be whether the undertaking of the grantee was in any
way influenced by the fact that the grantor had not assumed the debt.
Should it be shown that the parties intended the assumption clause only to
indemnify the grantor in case he should be found personally responsible,
then the grantee should not be held to a performance greater than that
promised. But if the consideration was given for an unconditional promise
to pay the debt, which was in no way influenced by the grantor's non-as-
sumption, there would appear to be no reason why the grantee should not
be held to his promise as much where the grantor had not, as vhere he had,
assumed the debt.
CORPORATIONS---RECOVERY OF UNPAID SUBSCRIPTIONS FOR DEBENTURES
UrON INSOLVENcY-A group of corporations issued "profit-sharing deben-
tures" payable at a fixed date, which entitled the holders to trade discounts
at the corporation stores. The corporations later consolidated and Issued
more "debentures" with the added feature of 81 interest payable out of the
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net profits. When the affairs of the corporation were wound up, the share-
holders and paid up debenture holders petitioned the court to require all
unpaid subscriptions to the "debentures" to be paid up, such subscribers
being joined as parties defendant. Demurrers to the complaint -were over-
ruled. Held, on appeal, that the debenture holders were not "shareholders,"
and hence were not responsible to creditors for their unpaid subscriptions.
Judgment reversed. Pettingill v. State Marketing Ass'7, 225 X. W. 834
(Wis. 1929).
The question of whether a. security holder, upon insolvency of the corpo-
ration, is responsible for the unpaid balance of the purchase price of the
securities is usually made to depend upon whether he was a "shareholder"
or "bondholder." The presence of certain incidents seems to have influenced
the courts i making this classification. Thus, -where payments are to be
made out of "profits" rather than out of "gross assets," the securities are
generally classed as "shares." In Te Hics-Fullcr Go., 9 F. (2d). 49Z (C.
C. A. 8th, 1925) ("interest" payable out of and principal redeemable out of
"net earnings") ; Jefferson Banking Co. v. Trustees of Martin Institute, 146
Ga. 383, 91 S. B. 463 (1917) (dividends and principal payable out of "in-
come or earnings" and secured by frst lien on the corporate property);
cf. Miller v. Rattermzn, 47 Ohio St. 141, 24 N. E. 496 (1890) (interest pay-
able out of "surplus profits"). And where the security has no maturity
date, the absence of such a feature has sometimes been sufflcienb to cause
it to be classified as a "share." United States & Alex. Oil Co. v. Keystone
Co., 19 F. (2d) 624 (W. D. Pa. 1924) (dividends and double the principal
at an uncertain future date were payable out of a special "bond-fund"
created for the purpose from the gross receipts of the company); Jefferson
Banking Co. v. Trustees of Mart. Istitute, supra (no maturity date).
These tests obviously cannot be conclusive since securities sometimes com-
bine incidents both of "bonds" and "shares." It would seem that the most
important consideration is the extent to which rights of creditors are in-
volved. Cf. Hamlin v. S& L. &- K. R. R., 78 Fed. 664 (C. C. A. 6th, 1897)
("preferred stockholders" -were given a lien. on the corporate property to
secure payment of dividends; in an action to wind up the affairs of the cor-
poration, held that this lien could have no priority over claims of creditors);
Boot v. Union Fibre Co., 142 Minn. 127, 171 X. W. 307 (1919). Another
factor to be considered is the apparent intention of the parties to the agree-
ment. See Arsbtrong v. Union Trust & Savings Bank 248 Fed. 268, 271
(C. C. A. 9th, 1918); Spencer v. Smith, 201 Fed. 647, 651 (C. C. A. 8th,
1912). In the instant ease, the evident intention of the parties was to
negotiate a loan, as shown in the certificates by the use of the words "de-
benture" and "bond," the provision for the redemption of the principal on
a certain date, the fact that all the authorized capital stock had already
been subscribed for, and that no control in the management was contracted
for. Since there was no such misrepresentation of the amount of the cap-
ital stock issued as to mislead creditors, it is sound policy to carry out what
appears to have been the intention of the parties.
.viDENcE--CRaNAL LAW-STATUTORY PRESUSIPTIONS-INSTRUcONS TO
Juy.-The defendant was indicted under a statute making it a felony to
issue a check without sufficient funds in the bank and with intent to defraud.
The statute provided that the making of a check, payment of which is re-
fused by the drawee, "shall be prima facie evidence of intent to defraud
and knowledge of insufficient funds." [OHIO GEn. CODE (Page, 1926) § 710-
176] At the trial the defendant produced evidence of an agreement with
the bank to hold his checks temporarily. In speaking of the refusal of the
bank to honor the check the court charged the jury: "You may regard
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such refusal.as sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the inten-
tion to defraud and knowledge of insufficient funds ... in the absence of
explanation or contradiction." The court als6 charged that notwithstanding
this prima fade presumption against the accused the jury must find that
he had been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant was
convicted. Held, on appeal, that the charge was prejudicial error. Ifoonig
v. State, 121 Ohio St. 147, 167 N. E. 385 (1929):
Under the usual criminal statute making certain preliminary facts prima
facie evidence of an ultimate fact, it is generally held error to instruct the
jury to the effect that the burden of explaining or rebutting the prima facie
evidence is on the defendant. State v. Simon, 163 Minn. 817, 203 N. W.
989 (1925); State v. Walser, 318 Mo. 833, 1 S. W. (2d) 147 (1927).. But
of. State v. Lively, 311 Mo. 414, 279 S. W. 76 (1925). This is usually put
upon the ground that such an instruction is inconsistent with the presump-
tion of innocence and the reasonable doubt rule. Scott v. State, 20 Ala.
App. 360, 102 So. 152 (1924) ; Etaber v. State, 250 Pac. 142 (0kla. 1926).
For the same reason the courts in general do not treat an ordinary statu-
tory presumption as a "Thayer-Wigmore presumption" requiring binding
instructions in the absence of evidence by the defendant. State v. LaPointo,
81 N. H. 227, 123 Atl. 692 (1924); State v. Besutick, 13 R . L 211 (1881).
But of. Neal v. -Comonuealth, 124 Va. 1842, 98 S. E. 629 (1919). And
although according to the Thayer-Wigmore theory the presumption should
disappear when the defendant does introduce evidence, a court, as in the
instant ease, will almost invariably mention the presumption in its instruc-
tions. But of. People v. Tate, 316 III. 52, 146 N. E. 487 (1925). The theory
stated by most courts is that a statutory presumption is sufficient in the
absence of other proof to sustain a conviction by the jury although it does
not require such conviction or shift the burden of proof. Commonwealth
v. Williams, 6 Gray 1 (Mass. 1856); Docey 'v. State, 279 Pac. 917 (0da.
1929). Where this theory prevails a court will ordinarily instruct the jury
that (a). the preliminary facts, if proved, are prima facie evidence of the
ultimate fact, but (b) the defendant is presumed to be innocent, and (c)
the burden is on the state, under all the facts and evidence, to satisfy the
jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. Stato v. Sanford,
317 Xo. 865, 297 S. W. 73 (1927) ; State v. Ru,'sell, 164 N. C. 482, 80 S. E.
66 (1913). Whether an ordinary jury can grasp the subtleties of the various
theories of presumptions is somewhat doubtful. The instant case illustrates
the fine distinctions involved. If the judge in his charge emphasized the
word way, the instruction could be considered as expressing the theory of
the majority of courts; but if he slighted that word, it could be held to have
shifted the burden of proof. Moreover, assuming that the jury understands
the charge, if, under the instructions usually given, they must be satisfied
of the proof of the ultimate fact beyond a reasonable doubt, the statutory
presumption should theoretically have no effect upon them. Actually, there-
fore, the real effect of the presumption is the artificial probative force given
to the state's testimony by the mention of the presumption in the instruction.
If the purpose of the statute is thus achieved in this informal way, it is
not the sharp distinctions of theori, but rather the practical effect of the
whole charge upon the jury which should be the chief concern of an appel-
late court.
EMINENT DOmAIm-EVIDENCE-ADmISSIBILiTY OF SALE PRICE Or NEIGH-
BORING PROPERTY TO PROVE VALUE OF CoNDEI'.NED PRorERTY.-Tho plaintiff
railroad brought an action to condemn certain land owned by the defendant.
To prove the value of his land, the defendant sought to introduce evidence
of a sale of neighboring land for $50,000. The record showed that the pur-
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chaser of the land paid only $1,000 in cash, installed an illicit still on the
property and later left the city after a raid by the police. The lower court
excluded the evidence. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be affirmed.
Muceino -v. Baltiiore & 0. B. B., 168 N. E. 752 (Ohio App. 1929).
Evidence of the selling price of neighboring property is generally held
admissible to prove the value of land taken in condemnation proceedings.
1 WiGI oE, EViDENc9 (2d ed. 1923) § 463; Campbel . New Havcn, 101
Conn. 173, 125 AtI 650 (1924) ; Big Sandy &- H. B. By. v. Stafford, 207 Ky.
272, 268 S. W. 1071 (1925). Contra: Roberts v. City of Philadelphia, 239
Pa. 339, 86 AtL 926 (1913) ; cf. Board of Education 'v". Heywood Mfg. Co.,
154 Minn. 486, 192 N. W. 102 (1923) (admissible only in exceptional cases
where no other evidence could be had). Some courts admit such evidence
only collaterally for the purpose of aiding in the determination of the -weight
to be given to opinions of expert witnesses. Gorgas v. Pliladelphia, H. &
P. R. R., 215 Pa. 501, 64 AtL 680 (1906) ; Board of Levee Com'rs v. Dillard,
76 Miss. 641, 25 So. 292 (1899); Chicago H. & M. Ry. 'a. Stewart, 47 Kan.
704, 28 Pac. 1017 (1892). The trial court has broad discretionary powers
*with regard to its admission or exclusion. Chicago N. S. & M. R. B. -r.
Chicago Title & T-mst Co., 328 flI. 610, 160 N. E. 226 (1928) ; Hcrvey v. City
of Providence, 47 R. I. 378, 133 Atl. 618 (1926); Unitc States -v. Nicker-
son, 2 F. (2d) 502 (C. C. A. 1zt, 1924). Generally, certain requisites must
be complied with in order to render the evidence admissible. Thus there
must be a sufficient showing of the similarity and proximity of the two
pieces of property. Vineyard Grove Co. v. Town of Oak Bluffe, 163 N. E.
888 (]lass. 192&); Department of Public Worl & Buildings -v. ecck,. 330
Ill. 39, 161 N. E. 55 (1928); Village of Reeder v. Hansen, 213 X. W. 492
(N. D. 1927). But cf. Virginian Power Co. v. Brothcrton, 90 W. Va. 155,
110 S. E. 546 (1922). The sale must not have been too remote 'in point of
time. McCabe v. City of Chelsea, 163 N. E. 255 (Mass. 1929); Common-
wealth. -. Combs, 229 Ky. 627, 17 S. W. (2d) 748 (1929) ; Dic:cy's E state v.
Houston Inependent School Dist, 300 S. W. 250 (Te. Civ. App. 1927).
And it must have been free from any element of compulsion. Xan:akco
Park DWi. ir. Heidenrichz, 328 Ill. 198, 159 N. B. 289 (1927); Buicd v.
Ozaukee County, 180 Wis. 45, 192 X. W. 380 (1923).; of. West SIxLo Drain-
age Dist. '. Dawson, 243 Ill. 175, 90 N. E. 377 (1909) (excluding evidence
of sale upon foreclosure of mortgage); 2 NICHnLs, EUMmNT DOM=Ru (2d
ed. 1917) § 456. Similarly, evidence of prices paid or agreed to be paid by
the condemnor to neighboring landowners is generally inadmissible on the
theory that such price had probably been influenced by a desire to avoid
the costs and uncertainty of litigation. Naftzger v. State, 24 Ohio App. 183,
156 N. E. 614 (1927) ; State -v. Wiight, 105 Neb. 617,181 N. W. 539 (1921) ;
2 LEWIs, " uB NNT Dowmm (3d ed. 1909) § 667. Contra: Charleston & W.
C. By. 'v. Spartanburg B. Warehouse, 149 S. E. 236 (S. C. 1929). In view
of the fact that the sale, in the instant case, -was made to a man of doubtful
financial responsibility who paid only 2% of the purchase price in cash, it
-would seem -reasonable to conclude that the selling price should be of little
significance in determining the value of neighboring land.
Exacuots Am ADm 0sTRA-ons-GuAArT AND SURpTYsI-RIGnT op
Surzry ON OND O DEFAULTING IDUCIARY TO CONTRIBUTION FROMI CO-
FmucrAR.--Two co-guardians gave separate guardianship bonds. One em-
bezzled the estate of the -ward under circumstances rendering the other re-
sponsible to the ward because of negligence, although he was not an active
participant in the embezzlement. The pl.intiff, a surety on the bond of the
embezzling co-guardian, paid a judgment in favor of the estate and brought
suit to secure contribution or indemnity from the negligent co-guardian and
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the sureties on the latter's bond. The lower court gave judgment for the
plaintiff against the co-guardian for the full amount of the judgment paid,
on the theory of subrogation to the right of the ward. Held, on appeal,
that the judgment be reversed, since the defendant co-guardian, although
responsible to the ward, would have been entitled to complete indemnity
from the embezzling co-guardian and the plaintiff. Southerm Surety Co. V.
Tedsunt, 228 N. W. 326 (Minn. 1929).
Generally, one exeuntor, administrator, or guardian is not responsible for
loss caused by the act of his co-fiduciary in the absence of negligence or
active participation. McKim v. Aulbach, 130 Mass. 481 (1881); Fltming V.
Walker, 152 Ala. S86, 44 So. 536 (1907): The scope of this rule has been
greatly narrowed by statutes requiring fiduciaries to give bonds. Where a
joint bond is given, most courts hold each executor jointly responsible as a
principal, regardless of fault, to creditors, legatees and sureties for a default
of his co-executor. Freeman v. Brewster, 93 Ga. 648, 21 S. E. 165 (1892) ; 2
WoERNER, AiERiCANo LAW Or ADMINISTRATION (3d ed. 1923) § 258. Where
the default is committed after the death of one co-executor, his estate may
be held similarly responsible. Eckert v. Myers, 45 Ohio St. 525, 15 N. E.
862 (1888). Contra: Towne v. Ammidown, 20 Pick. 535 (Mass. 1888). A
few courts, however, have held that the execution of a joint bond does not
change the rule of responsibility, the joint bond being regarded, for this
purpose, as the separate bond of each. Nanz v. Oakley, 120 N. Y. 84, 24 N.
E. 306 (1890); 2 WoERNEn, loc. cit. supra. Although one executor, through
negligence, or by virtue of a joint bond, may render himself responsible to
the estate or creditors for a default of his co-executor, he may be entitled fo
complete indemnity against his co-executor. McCartin v. Traplzgen, 43 N.
J. Eq. 323, 11 At. 156 (1887) (property of defaulting trustee sequestered to
satisfy judgment against the co-trustees in favor of the cestui) ; Part ingon
v. Allen, 57 L. T. R. (N.s.) 654 (1887); Lincolnv . Wright, 4 Beav. 427
(1841). (legatee's proof in bankruptcy against embezzling executor ordered
to be assigned to negligent co-executor from whom the legatee had re-
covered) ; see Newton v. Newton, 53 N. H. 537, 538 (1873). It would seem
to follow that a co-fiduciary who has been held responsible to the estate al-
though not himself a participant in the default might secure indemnity from
the surety on a separate bond of the defaulting fiduciary. But such in-
demnity has been refused as against the surety on a joint bond, for the
asserted reason that the fiduciary seeking indemnity is himself a principal
on the bond. M'Divitt v. M"Divitt, 4 Watts 384 (Pa. 1835). But of. Nanz
v. Oaklde, supra. Where a recovery has been obtained against one of two
executors, neither of whom is more at fault than the other, he may obtain
contribution from his co-executor. Marsk v. Harr.ngton, 18 Vt. 150 (1846).
But one co-executor who is solely or primarily at fault may not secure con-
tribution. Cheever v. Ellis, 144 Mich. 47, 108 N. W. 390 (1906). Recovery
by one fiduciary from his co-fiduciary, either by -way of contribution or in-
demnity, being dependent upon comparative fault, it would seem that the
court quite properly denied a recovery in the instant case.
INTERSTATE CoamsEc--TAxATIoN-TAx ON PRIVILEGE OF USING PUBLI0
HIGHWAYS WITHIN STATE.--The state of New Jersey, in addition to property
taxes, provided for a franchise tax to be collected from all taxpayers using
or occupying public streets, highways, roads or other places for telephone
and telegraph lines, etc. The tax was to be on such proportion of gross
receipts as the length of the line or mains in the streets bore to the length
of the whole line or mains. As the lines were used both for intrastate and
interstate messages, the defendant telephone company objected to paying
that part of the tax based on receipts from its interstate commerce. Held,
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on appeal (two justices dissenting), that the exvaction was a direct tax on
gross receipts derived from the company's interstate commerce, and, as to
that part at least, void. New Jersey Bell Tele-pl n Co. v. Stato Board of
Taxes and Assessments of N. J., 50 Sup. Ct. II (U. S. 1930).
A state tax which regulates or burdens interstate commerce is held to
be unconstitutional. PhiladelpIdh and Southern S. S. -Co. v. Pennsylvania,
122 U. S. 326, 7 Sup. Ct. 1118 (1887); McCalUc Go. v. Massachusotts, 279
U S. 620, 49 Sup. Ct. 432 (1929)-. But a state property tax which inci-
dentally burdens interstate commerce is not thereby unconstitutional.
Railroad Co. v. Peni'ton, 18 Wall. 5 (U. S. 1873); Postal Telcgraph Co. v,.
Adam, 155 U. S. 688, 15 Sup. Ct. 268 (1895); Union Tank Line Go. v'.
Wight, 249 U. S. 275, 39 Sup. Ct. 276 (1919). These two "rules" cearly
admit of no clear-cut separation, the function o4 the court being to draw
between them a practical line, making distinctions of degree rather than of
kind. See Galveston, H. and S. A. Ry. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217, 227, 28 Sup.
Ct. 688, 640 (1908). When the tax is computed on gross receipts of a com-
pany engaging in interstate commerce, the court must decide whether the
receipts are being taxed as such, or whether they are being used as a means
of evaluating the subject of the tax. See Cudahy Pacing Co. w. Minncsota,
246 U. S. 450, 453, 38 Sup. Ct. 373, 375 (1918). A tax on gross receipts as
such is unconstitutional. Gdlveston, H. & S. A. Ry. v. Tex=, oupra; Myer
v. Wells, Fargo and Co., 223 U. S. 298,32 Sup. Ct. 218 (1912). But a prop-
erty tax based on the gross receipts from business done -within a state, even
though taking into account the proportionate parts of interstate journeys
made -within the state, is considered constitutional. Maine . Grand Trunk
By., 142 U. S. 217, 12 Sup. Ct. 121 (1891) ; U. S. Ezpre= Co. T. Minnesota,
223 U. S. 335, 32 Sup. Ct. 211 (1912) ; Cudahy Packing Co. v. Minnesota,
supra; Pullman Co. v. Ric ardson, 261 U. S. 330, 43 Sup. Ct. 366 (1923).
The tax in the instant case is based on that part of the gross receipts rep-
risented by the ratio of the value of the lines in the street to the value of
all the lines. This proportionate levy would seem to remove the tax from
the category of taxes on gross receipts as such, and classify it as a thx
using the receipts as an appropriate means of ascertaining the value to the
defendant of the public land used. Nevertheless, were this intended as a tax
on the tangible property of the defendant, it would be unconstitutional as be-
ing levied in Addition to existing property taxes. Cudahy Packing Co. v.
Galveston, H. & S. A. By. v. Texas; 3eyer v. Wells, Fargo & Co., both supra,
But both the Court and the New Jersey legislature called it a franchise tax
rather than a property tax. An earlier case, upholding a charge on a tele-
phone company for the privilege of using the streets for its poles, called that
charge a rental. St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 148 U. S. 92,
13 Sup. Ct. 485 (1893). The Court might here as easily have called this
exaction a rental for the use of the streets as did the Sk. Louis case, or a
price for the privilege of-using the streets, as did Mr. Justice Holmes (see
his dissenting opinion, p. 114). The C6urt seems to have taken refuge in
the term "franchise tax," and then, by calling to mind the associations ordi-
narily connoted by that term, to have declared the tax unconstitutional.
This reasoning seems scarcely in accord with the announced policy of the
Court to determine the constitutionality of these taxes "upon our own
judgment of the actual operation and effect of the tax, irrespective of the
form it bears or how it is characterized by the state courts." See Crew
Levic Co. -v. Pennsylvania, 245 U. S. 292, 294, 88 Sup. Ct 126, 127 (1917).
JUDGMENTS--IES JUDICATA-]FFECT ON THoSE NOT P WTrs TO PROCEo-
3NG.-The plaintiff fled a bill to enjoin the mayor and council from acting
under a statute which empowered the council to levy the cost of improving
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streets against abutting property. In a previous suit by another abutting
owner attacking the constitutionality of the same statute and seeking to
enjoin the enforcement of prospective liens on property on the same street,
the constitutionality of the act was sustained, and that plaintiff did not
appeal. The present plaintiff contended that he was not bound by the
former decree because he had no knowledge of the prior proceeding. The
decree of the lower court was for the defendants on the ground of res judi-
cata. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be affirmed. Holt v. Mozley, 147
Atl. 596 (Md. 1929).
Generally, one not joined as a formal party plaintiff or defendant will not
be barred by a judgment even though he had knowledge of the suit or as-
sisted a litigant outside of court. Old Dominion o. v. Bigelow, 225 U. S.
111, 32 Sup. Ct. 641 (1912) ; Womack v. St. Joseph, 201 Mo. 467, 100 S. W. 443
(1906). But where one has actively participated in a proceeding, though
not a formal party, a judgment therein may bar a subsequent suit. Plumb
v. Goodenow, 12& U. S. 560, 8 Sup. Ct. 216 (1887) (employing counsel);
State v. St. Louis, 145 Mo. 551, 46 S. W. 98 (1898). (taking charge of pro-
ceedings in court); Cecil v. Cecil, 19 Md. 72.(1867) (paying court costs);
Souffront v. La Compagne Des Sucreries, 217 "U. S. 475, 0 Sup. Ct 608
(1909) (inducing another to become a party to an action). An& where
the question is one common to many persons, as in the instant case, a final
decree in a suit brought by one,. wherein a judgment would react to the
benefit of the entire group, may be conclusive as to all under the doctrine
of class representation. Cf. CLARK, CoDn PLEAiANG (1928) 27; EQuITY
RuLEs op U. S. SuREE COURT (1912) Rule 38; Supreme TWribe of Ben Hur
v. Cauble, 255 U. S. 356, 41 Sup. Ct. 338 (1920) (suit by member of frater-
nal organization against its officers).; Gallagher v. Moundsville, 34 W. Va.
730, 12 S. E. 859 (1892) (suit by property owner contesting tax levy);
Stewart v. Oneal, 237 Fed. 897 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917) (contingent remainder-
man born subsequent to first suit concluded when remaindermen in
esse were parties to the first litigation of same question); Estate of
Clark v. Newton, 190 Cal. 354, 212 Pac. 622 (1923) (judgment in action by
administrator to recover property of estate binding on heirs); Conroy v.
Cover, 80 Colo. 434, 252 Pac. 883 (192") (decree in suit by one of group of
cestuis to recover trust money binding on rest); Detroit v. Detroit Ry., 226
Mich. 354, 197 N. W. 697 (1924) (bill by bondholders for allocation of mort-
gage liens conclusive on all holders of same type of bond). But of. Down y
v. Seib, 185 N. Y. 427, 78 N. E. 66 (1906) (unbopn remaindermen not con-
cluded where their interests were shown to be antagonistic to those of the
persons who in theory represented them in the prior court). While the
plaintiff in the second suit will usually have been cognizant of the Previous
litigation by another member of his class, lack of such knowledge, as in
the instant case, will not defeat a plea of res judicata. McIntosk v. Pitts'
burg, 112 Fed. 705 (W. D. Pa. 1901). To support such a plea, however, it
must appear that the present plaintiff's interests were in fact fairly repre-
sented in the prior suit. Cf. Lindsay v. Allen, 112 Tenn. 637, 82 S. W. 171
(1904) ; Lee v. Albro, 91 Ore. 211, 278 Pac. 784 (1929). And some of the
litigants in the former action must have been in exactly the same class as
the present plaintiff. Ottensoser v. Scott, 47 Fla. 276, 37 So. 161 (1904).
But cf. El Reno v. Cleveland-TWnidad Co., 25 Okla. 648, 107 Pac. 163 (1910).
(plaintiff paving company and defendant city officials were both defendants
in previous suit by taxpayers seeking to enjoin a paving contract because of
illegality; held, that legality of the contract was res judicata in suit for
payment by the paving company).
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MUMS AM MIUNN--INJUNMONS-SUIT BY SURFACE OMar TO BsrTAnT
bNIMG WHERE YINERAL OWNER HAS GiVEN SECU!UTY AGAINST DAAGu-
The plaintiff, owner of the surface of certain land, sought to enjoin the de-
fendant, lessee of the mineral rights beneath, from continuing mining oper-
ations, alleging that irreparable injury to the surface would result. A
statute provided that where the surface and mining rights are separate,
the surface owner may demand security from the miner and, if it be refused,
may enjoin him from mining until it is given. [CoLO. Couap. LAws (1921)
§ 3299] The lower court declined to grant a permanent injunction but en-
joined the defendant from mining only until a suffcient indemnity bond be
given by him to the surface owner. Hcld, on appeal, that the judgment be
affirmed. Whiles v. Grand Junction Mining and Fuel Co., 282 Pac. 260
(Colo. 1929).
The common law theory is that the right to subjacent support of the soil
is absolute, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, and that it is
no defense to an action to recover damages for injury to the surface that
there was no negligence in the conduct of the mining operations. Alabama
Clay Products Co. v. Black 215 Ala. 170, 110 So. 151 (1926) ; 1 TiFFAiy,
REAL Paormary (2d ed. 1920) § 346; 3 LMLDr-r, M;ws (3d ed. 1914) §
818; cf. Colev . Signal Knob Coal Co., 95 W. Va. 702, 122 S. E. 268 (1924)
(recovery for injuries to horse by fall into opening caused by excavation
beneath). And it is generally said that land is property of peculiar value
and, -where a threatened injury is irreparable and money damages inade-
quate, an injunction will be issued to protect the surface owner, even though
it require leaving the mineral entirely untouched. Bibbcy v. Buwch, 176
Ala. 585, 58 So. 916 (1912); Moss -v. Jourdan, 129 Miss. 598, 92 So. 689
(1922); MAcSwINNyY, ms (5th ed. 1922) 279. But in a few jurisdic-
tions the "balance of equities" doctrine has been appealed to and an injunc-
tion denied where the injury to the miner would exceed the injury sustained
by the surface owner, although the surface might be irreparably damaged.
Lloyd v. Catlin Coal Co., 210 Ill. 460, 71 N. E. 335 (1904) ; Barker v. Mint-,
73 Colo. 262, 215 Pac. 534 (1923) ; see Bcrkj v. Bewind-WLito Coal Mining
Co., 220 Pa. 65, 75, 69 AtI. 329, 332 (1908) ; (1923) 33 YAMZ L. J. 205. The
statute, upon which the decision in the instant case was based, had pre-
viously been construed by the Colorado court to be non-exclusive, i.e., to give
the surface owner a right in addition to his existing equitable rights; but
in the particular case an injunction against the owner of the mineral was
held unreasonable under the "balance of equities" theory. Barker -. Miutz,
sapra. The instant case construes the statute as "restrictive," holding that
where a bond is given or offered the court may "in its discretion" permit
the mining operations to be continued. The net effect of this interpreta-
tion of the statute is to approve the balance of equities doctrine. In situa-
tions where the value of mineral rights is generally in excess of the value
of the surface, economic welfare sanctions the departure from the usual
rule. Cf. (1930) 43 HARV. L. REV. 662.
PATENTS-SUBrEaT htATTER-"PRocESS" AND "'MnUFA neTZ" CLAMS.-
The plaintiff's assignor was refused a "process" patent but was allowed an
"apparatus" patent upon a "transportation package" calculated to facili-
tate the shipment of foodstuffs. Solid carbon dioxide (COs) was specified
as the refrigerant. Instead of surrounding the food stuff with the refrig-
erant as the former practice had dictated, the carbon dioxide was sur-
rounded with the food stuff. By thus insulating the refrigerant from ex-
terior heat its efficiency -was greatly increased. Purchasers of carbon dio.i4e
from the plaintiff were authorized to use it to make up the transportation
packages in question. The defendant sold carbon dioxide of its own manu-
YALE LAW JOURNAL
facture to one of the plaintiff's customers to be used in making up the
transportation packages. In a suit for contributory infringement, the de-
fendant alleged, inter alia, the invalidity of the patent. This defense was
sustained by the district court. American Patents Corp. v. Carbico Corp.,
25 F. (2d). 730 (E. D. N. Y. 1928). Held, on appeal, that the judgment be
reversed. Aimrican Patents Corp. v. Carbic Co rp., decided by the Circuit
Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 1930.
A patentable subject matter is defined by statute to be the invention of
any new "art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter" or any im-
provement thereof. 29 STAT. 692 (1897), 35 U. S. C. § 31 (1929); 32 STAT.
193 (1902), 35 U. S. C. § 73 (1929). To obtain a valid patent, the invention
must fall within at least one of these statutory categories. O'Reilly v.
Morse, 15 How. 62 (U. S. 1853); 1 WALM, PATENTS (6th ed. 1929) § 18.
A "principle" or "law of nature" lies beyond the boundary of these cate-
gories. O'Reil y v. Morse, supra; Morton v. N. Y. Eye Infirmary, 5 Blatch.
116 (S. D. N. Y. 1862). Yet a process prescribing the specific order or
physical means of applying "laws of nature" to achieve a certain result is
regarded as an "art" within the meaning of the statute. See Coohrano v.
Deener, 94 U. S. 780, 788 (1876) ; of. Hollznd Furnitura Co. v. Perkins Gl1o
Co., 277 U. S. 245, 48 Sup. Ct. 474 (1928). Accordingly, as the court inti-
mates in its opinion in the instant case, a "process" patent might properly
have been issued to the plaintiff's assignor. Cf. Yablick . Protooto Safoty
Appliance Corp., 21 F. (2d) 885 (C. C. A. 3d, 1927) ; Low v. MMcast er, 266
Fed. 518 (C. C. A. 3d, 1920). Yet the various categories of patentable sub-
ject matter are not mutually exclusive and, in addition to a "process" claim,
a patent may be issued for the product of a "process" as embodied in a new
"mnachine, manufacture or composition of matter." American Fruit Growers
v. Bragdez Co., 35 F. (2d) 106 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929); Telephone Cases, 126
U. S. 1 (1888). Of these latter categories, a "manufacture" is considered
the broadest in that it includes any new product not found in nature which
isneither a "machine" nor a "composition of matter." Johnson v. Johnston,
60 Fed. 618 (W. D. Pa. 1894) (special index); International Mausoleum Co.
v..Sievert, 213 Fed. 225 (C. C. A. 6th, 1914) (building); American Frit
Growers v. Bragdez, supra (borax treated oranges); In ro Haddon, 20 F.
(2d) 275. (Ct. of App. D. C. 1927) (grandstand construction); Cincinnati
Tdction Co. v. Pope, 210 Fed. 443 (C. C. A. 6th, 1913) (form of street car
transfers). But of. Fond du Lao County v. May, 137 U. S. 395, 11 Sup. Ct.
98 (1890).; American Disappearing Bed Co. v. Arnaeldtein, 182 Fed. 324
(C. C. A. 9th, 1910). But an absolute distinction between a "manufacture"
and a "machine," or a "manufacture" and "composition of matter," is ad-
mittedly impossible. WALKm?, op. cit. supra § 33; HOPKINS, PATENTS
(1921) § 35. And similarly, although a distinction between a "process"
and a "manufacture" may be found in the difference between an intangible
method of production and the resulting tangible product, it would seem that
with the complexity of modern invention, the process and the product are
often so inseparably interwoven as to make even this distinction more or less
arbitrary. Cf. Goodyear v. Central R. R., 10 Fed. Cas. No. 5,568 (C. C. X.
J. 1854); Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.'S. 568 (1876); Cochrano . Badisdho
Anilin. and Soda Fabrik, 111 U. S. 293, 4 Sup. Ct. 455 (1884) ; WALXK1, op.
cit. supra. § 31. In the instant case, the court brings the patentee's claim
within the scope of the broadest of the statutory categories by regarding
the completed package of carbon dioxide and food stuff as a "manufacture."
It would seem that the discovery might more properly have been called a
"process," since the novel nanner of arranging the two substances was the
important feature of the patentee's creation. But in view of the nebulous
character of the lines separating the different divisions of patentable subject
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matter, if a discovery is described in the patent claim with suficient clarity
definitely to bound the limits of the desired monopoly, and it also satisies
the usual tests of "invention," there appears no compelling reason for deny-
ing protection merely because the patentee or the patent office attached the
wrong name to the invention. See Ames -v. Howard, 1 Fed. Cas. No. 326
(C. C. Mass. 1833).; Goodyear v. Central R. R., supra at 678.
PRAcTIc--NEw TIAL-CoNwucT BETEwEN PAnTIs ANo JUnoRs--GRATu-
izms Ainm VER=cT.-A statute provided that if either party in a cause in
which a verdict was returned gave to any of the jurors who tried the cause
any treat or gratuity, during the same term of the court, before or after
the trial, the court on motion of the adverse party might set aside the ver-
dict and order a new trial. [ME. REV. STAT. (1916) c. 87, § 109] On the
day following the rendition of a verdict for the plaintiff, his attorney invited
the jurors who sat on the ease to take dinner with him. On the next day,
the jurors accepted the invitation. Upon learning of the above statute the
attorney withdrew his invitation. The defendants moved for a new trial
under the statute. Held, that the motion be sustained and a new trial
granted. Ellis v. Emerson, 14T AtI. 761 (Me. 1929).
Where a prevailing party attempts improperly to influence the action of
any of the jurors, a new trial will be granted without reference to the ques-
tion whether or not the attempt was successful. A.in -v. Labo Superior
Consol. Iron Mines, 103 Binn. 204, 11-4 N. W. 654 (1903). Conversation
with a juror or in the presence of a juror in relation to the trial will war-
rant the granting of a new trial. Sherlock t. Dinneen, 42 S. D. 533, 176
N. W. 519 (1920).; BMannng -v. Atlanta, B. & A. By., 206 Ala. 629, 91 So.
446 (1921) ; N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Turner, 210 Ala. 197, 97 So. 687 (1923).
This result has been reached even where the conversation had no relation
to the trial. Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Courson, 212 Ala. 1, 101 So. 642
(1924). But casual meetings and the interchange of ordinary civilities be-
tween a party and a juror during the recesses of the court -wll not ordin-
arily be sufficient to avoid the verdict. Boswel v. Land, 217 Ala. 39, 114
So. 470 (1927); Nelson v. K'Mhfelk., 158 Minn. 163, 197 N. W. 253 (1924);
Vincent v. Heenan, 194 Mich. 316, 160 N. W. 563 (1916). A new trial will
generally be granted if jurors are entertained during the trial by the party
in whose favor a verdict is rendered. Lynch -v. Kindoiph, 204 Iowa 762,
216 N. W. 2 (1927); Jones -v. Frank, 62 Otda. 26, 161 Pac. 795 (1916);
Steenburgh v. McRarie, 60 Misc. 510, 113 N. Y. Supp. 1118 (Sup. Ct. 1908)
(entertainment furnished by counsel for prevailing party); Rainey -v. State,
100 Ga. 82, 27 S. E. 709 (1896) (entertainment furnished by state's attorney
in criminal prosecution); ANN. CAs. 1912B 744. This rule is based on the
policy of the law to keep the jurors free from any influence that would tend
to prejudice them against or in favor of either party, in order to avoid all
grounds of suspicion and to safeguard the confidence of the public and the
litigants in the judicial system. See Lynch v. t eindolph, supra, at 770, 216
N. W. at 6; Sherlock' v. Dinneen, supra, at 534, 176 N. W. at 520. And it
would seem that the existence of an improper motive or actual influence
upon the verdict is not essential. Scott v. Tubbs, 43 Colo. 221, 95 Pac. 540
(1908); Jones v. Fank, supra. Contra: St. Louis By. -v. Ellontwood, 12
Ark. 428,185 S. W. 763 (1916). But where knowledge of the misconduct was
acquired before the verdict, the failure to bring the matter to the attention
of the court until after the verdict was rendered has been held a waiver of
the objection. Wetzler v. Glassnwr, 185 Wis. 593, 201 N. W. 740 (1925);
cf. Copper Queen Mining Co. v. Aisonc Prin e Copper Co., 2 Ari7. 10, 7
Pac. 718 (1885). Contra: N. Y. ife I=. Co. . Turner, supra. Where the
action complained of takes place after verdict, as in the instant case, the
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objections may be: (1) the influence such action might have on juries in
future litigation involving the offending party, and (2) the implication to
be drawn from such action of influence on the jury exerted before verdict.
The instant decision would seem to be supported only on the latter ground.
RECEIVERS-POINTMENT WITHOUT NOTICE TO THE .ADVERSME PARny.-The
plaintiffs, suing to foreclose a lien on the buildings, machinery, and equip-
raent of the defendant mining company, filed an affidavit alleging that the
defendant was rapidly proceeding to wreck its mine and to remove and sell
all its property, that it had no other assets out of which the plaintiffs could'
collect their claim, and that if the plaintiffs were required to give notice of
application for a receiver the defendant would have disposed of all the prop-
erty covered by the lien before the application could be heard. The lower
ourt grante, the plaintiffs' petition to have a receiver appointed without
notice to the defendant. Held on appeal, that the facts alleged did not
warrant an appointment of a receiver without notice, the plaintiffs having
failed to show that a temporary restraining order would not have afforded
hmple protection. Judgment reversed. Firestone Coal Mining Co. V. Root-
zel, 169 N. E. 465 (Ind. 1930).
Statements of the rule that a court will not appoint a receiver without
notice to the adverse party generally include an exception of cases where
the plaintiff can show an emergency in which irreparable loss will be caused
by the giving of notice or by any delay necessary thereto. See Ledger Pub-
lishing Co. v. Scott, 193 Ind. 683, 685, 141 N. E. 609 (1923).; 1 CwARk, RE-
cnrvEns (2d ed.. 1929) § 82. Due to a natural disinclination to take liber-
ties with the defendant's property when he does not appear, however, the
professed exception-has been hedged in by many qualifications. Thus a mere
statement that an emergency exists without pertinent facts to prove it has
been held insufficient to justify an appointment without notice. General
Motors Oil Co. v. Matheny, 185 Ind. 114, 113 N. E. 4'(1916) ; cf. Delcambre
-v. Murphy, 5 S. W. (2d) 789 (Tex. 1928). And where no affidavit has been
filed, verification of the complaint on information and belief has also been
considered insufficient. Henderson v. Reynolds, 168 Ind. 522, 81 N. E. 494
"(1907), 11 Ann. Cas. 977 (1909). Moreover, a receiver will generally not
be appointed without notice if any other remedy for the emergency is avail-
able. Kent Ave. Grocery Co. v. Hitz & Co., 181 Ind. 606, 120 N. E. 659
(1918) (remedy by restraining order held adequate) ; Rashaw v. Straus Co.,
94 Okla. 141, 221 Pac. 62 (1923) (remedy by attachment held adequate).
But of. Temple State Bank v. Mansfield, '215 S. W. 154 (Tex. 1919).
Tle scope of the exception is even further limited by a very strict inter-
pretation of what constitutes an emergency" which will cause irreparable
loss. Feess v. Mechanics' State Bank, 84 Kan. 828, 115 Pac. 563 (1911) (al-
legation by shareholder that directors were operating bank fraudulently and
about to disp6se of assets in a way to make the stock worthless hold in-
sufficient); Pueat v. Prudential Ins. Co., 38 Okla. 15, 131 Pac. 914 (1918),
Ann. Cas. 1915C 894 (allegation that defendant intended to dissipate money
of ward held insufficient). In cases where the plaintiff finds it difficult or
impossible to serve notice on the defendant, however, notice is often not re-
quired. Schmid v. Ballard, 175 Minn. 138, 220 N. W. 423 (1928) ; Tuller v.
Waynw Circuit Judge, 243 Mich. 239, 219 N. W. 939 (1928) (defendant de.
liberately avoiding service). And where the defendant appears for any
6ther reason than to object to the lack of notice he will be deemed to have
waived the defect. Union State Bank v. Mueller, 68 Oka. 152, 172 Pac. 650
(1618). But cf. Claunch v. Claunch, 203 S. W. 930 (Tex. 1918). But aside
from cases involving these last two situations there are only one or two
scattered instances within the last twenty-five years where such an emer-
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gency has been deemed to exist as would justify the appointment of a re-
ceiver without notice to the adverse party. Temple State Bank v. Manpfild,
supra (allegation that trust fund was in danger of being lost, diverted,
misapplied, and put beyond the reach of the court).; of. O'Laughlin v.
P0ocklsk 106 Kan. 616, 189 Pac. 383 (1920).
STATUTE OF LIITATIONS-APPLICABITI'Y TO CAUSES op AcroN ANTE-
DATING THE STATTE.-The plaintiff brought suit just within the four year
limitation period setby the statute in force when the cause of action accrued.
The defendant demurred to the complaint on the ground that the action
was barred by an intervening amendment to the statute, which provided
- that "An action for bodily injury or injury to personal property shall be
brought -within two years after the cause thereof arose." The trial court
overruled the demurrer. Held, on appeal (one justice dissenting), that the
judgment be affirmed. Fallar v. fassachusetts Bondingr and Ina. Co., 168
N. E. 394 (Ohio 1929).
On the theory that a statute of limitations affects only the remedy, it is"
well settled that a legislature has the power to make a new and shorter pe-"
niod of limitation applicable to existing causes of action. 1 WooD, Lnh=&-
TiONS (1916) § 11; Note (1905) 1 L. P. A. (x. s.) 528. But the due proces
clause is held to restrict this power so that a reasonable time in which to
commence suit must be allowed before the new limitation is to tale effect
WOOD, loc. cit. supra; COOLEr, CONSTiTUTIONAL Lmn os (1906) 523; see
Aichlfalayffs Land Co. v. Williams Cypress Co., 146 La. 1047, 1063, 34 So.
351, 357 (1920). Where no express provision is made in the amended statute
for its application to existing causes of action, the cases are in conflict as to
whether such operation should be implied. It has been held that the statute
in force at the time of suit governs, provided only that the qualification as
to reasonable time to sue is satisfied. Savsberramyv. Hughes, 174 Ind. 638;
92 N. E. '783 (1910) ; National Surety Co. v. Morgan, 20 Ala. App. 42, 100
So. 460 (1924). But most courts -will give the new statute only a pros-
pective effect unless a contrary intent on the part of the legislature is either
expressed or clearly implied. Harison, v. Harman, 76 W. Va. 412, 85 S. E.
646 (1915) ; Baruhardt -v. MAorison, 178 N. C. 563, 101 S. E. 218 (1919) ;
Philadelphia B. & W. B-. v. Quaker City Flour Mills Co., 282 Pa. 362, 12T
At. 845 (1925). The courts will generally consider such an intent indicatel
by a provision that the amended statute is not to become effective for a
specified period after passage, and if the period is reasonable the statute
will be given retrospective effect. KozisLe -v. Brigham, 169 Munn. 57, 210,
N. W. 622 (1926); Note (1906) 7 L. R. A. (N.s.) '715. But see People -.
Cohen, 245 N. Y. 419; 422, 157 N. E. 515, 516 (1927). Since no such pro-
vision was included in the instant statute, the court refused to apply the'
statute to an accrued claim, on the ground that to do so would destroy the.
plaintiff's vested right to a cause of action. Inasmuch as the Ohio Con-
stitution provides that no act shall become effective until 90 days after it hasr
been filed by the governor, an argument against retrospective operation,
based on the absence of a time provision, would seem better directed at a
lack of legislative intent than at a violation of the due process clause. Cf.
Gilbert -v. Ackt:iman, 159 N. Y. 118, 53 N. E. 753 (1899). But cf. Osborna
-v. Lindstrom, 9 N. D. 1, 81 N. W. 72, 46 L. R. A. 715 (1899). But the refusal
to bar the instant action may well have been warranted not only by am
absence of evidence as to specific legislative intent, but also by the fact that
the 90 day period granted by the constitution did not afford a reasonable op-
portunity for the institution of suit, because during that time the statute
-was not readily available to the public. See Adams & Freese Go. v. Ewnor.,
17 N. D. 302, 309, 116 N. W. 98, 100 (1908).
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TAXATioN-CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW-FEDERAL TAXATION OF MUNICIPAL
BONDs.-The plaintiff paid under protest a federal income tdx levied on the
profit realized on the appreciated value of municipal bonds. In a suit brought
to recover the sum so paid tie lower court gave judgment for the plaintiff.
Held, on appeal, that the judgment be affirmed. Bunn v. Willcuts, 35 F.
(2d). 29 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
It is fundamental that state and federal governments may not tax the
instrumentalities of each other. McCullough v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (U.
S. 1819). But instrumentalities performing a function not usually con-
sidered of an essential governmental character are taxable. South Cwrolina
v. United States, 199 U. S. 437, 26 Sup. Ct. 110 (1905) (federal tax on state
liquor dispensary); Salt Lake City v. Hollister, 118 U. S. 256, 6 Sup. Ct.
1055 (1886) (federal tax on liquor illegally distilled by city); Veazio Bank
'v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 (U. S. 1869) (federal tax on state bank notes); Stato
of North Dakota v,. Ols'n, 33 F. (2d) 848 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929) (federal tax
on bank of which state was sole shareholder).; (1929) 89 YA= L. J. 279.
But taxation by either government of, or based on, the security issues of
the other has uniformly been held unconstitutional as being a burden on
the government's power to borrow. Macallen Co. v. Massachusetts, 279 U.
S. 620, 49 Sup. Ct. 432 (1929) ; Pollock -v. Far mers' Loan and Trust Co., 157
U. S. 429 (1895.).; (1929) 29, CoL. L. REV. 675; Note (1929) 43 HAV. L.
REv. 280. Unfortunately perhaps, in the application of the broad principle
laid down in McCulloch v. Maryland, the insignificance of the burden; on
the government imposed by the tax does not seem to have been considered
material. Cf. Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501, 42 Sup. Ct. 111 (1922)
(state tax on income of lessee derived from a lease of restricted Indian lands
held unconstitutional) ; Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113 (U. S. 1870) (federal
income tax based on salary of state official held unconstitutional); Pan-
handle Oil Co. v. State of Mississippi, 277 U. S. 218, 48 Sup. Ct. 451 (1928)
(state tax on gasoline sold to federal government levied on dealer held un-
constitutional).. The consideration of such a factor might well have pro-
duced a desirable flexibility. It is noteworthy that the courts of Canada
and Australia have expressly refused to follow McCullough v. Maryland.
Abbott -v. City of Saint John, 40 Can. Sup. Ct. 597 (1908) (tax on official's
salary upheld) ; Webb v. Outtrin, [1907] A. C. 81 (same).
TRUSTS-RESULTiN(G TRusTs-FnAuDurNT CONVEANC.-The heirs of
one Griffin brought suit to have a resulting trust declared in property which
Griffin had purchased but title to which had been taken in the name of his
son, the defendant, to protect it from possible future creditors. It did not
appear that any creditors were ever injured thereby.. The lower court dis-
missed the bill on the ground that Griffin's fraudulent purpoge would have
prevented the declaration of a resulting trust in his favor, and that his
heirs stood in his shoes. Held, on appeal, that the decree be affirmed. Lieb
v. Griffin, 147 Atl. 634 (N. J. 1929).
A conveyance to another than the one paying the purchase price generally
raises a presumption of a resulting trust, except where the purchaser is the
husband of the grantee or stands in loco parentiv, in which cases the pre-
sumption of a gift is raised. See Higginbotham v. Boggs, 234 Fed. 253, 256
(C. C. A. 4th, 1916); BOGET, TRusts (1921) § 33. But these presumptions
are rebuttable, and by parol. Rolofson v. Malone, 315 Ill. 275, 146 N. E. 169
(1924). (resulting trust rebutted) ; Brennaman v. Schell, 212 IMI. 356, 72 N.
E. 412 (1904) (gift rebutted). .Where it appears that the transaction was
"fraudulent" or "illegal" in purpose, the usual rule is to deny a resulting
trust to the purchaser. Higginbotham v. Boggs, supra (fraud of judgment
creditor); Gammage v. Latham, 222 S. W. 469 (Mo. 1920) (to cut off right
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of redemption); Dermj w. Fielder, 216 Mo. 176, 115 S. W. 412 (1909) (avoid
dower); see Asan. v. Asam, 239 Pa. 295, 297, 86 At]. 871, 872 (1913)
(dower); cf. Vernew '. Skute, 232 2ass. 397, 122 N. E. 315 (1919) (in fraud
of creditors). Contra: Brennaman -v. Schel, cupra (husband's "dower");
ef. 1 Pmmy, T-RUSTS A TnusTEEs (Ith ed. 1929) § 165, n. 5. The heirs or
assignees of the purchaser stand in his position. Sell v. West, 125 Mo. 621,
28 S. W. 969 (1894) (heirs) ; Miller v. Davis, 50 Mo. 572 (1872) (assignees).
But in spite of fraud, a resulting trust may be declared for the benefit of
creditors. McKey v. Cochran, 262 Ill. 376, 104 N. E. 693 (1914) ; Hcr'icl v.
Woodrou-Shindler Co., 75 Colo. 363, 226 Pac. 137 (1924). In the cases
where there was no such relationship betweei; purchaser and grantee as to
raise the presunmption of a gift, a few courts have allowed a resulting trust
in spite of a fraudulent purpose, on the theory that the purchaser, being
aided by the presumption in his favor, did not have to rely on his fraudulent
purpose to establish his case. Monahan v. Monahan, 77 Vt 133, 59 At]. 169
(1904); (1905). 18 HARv. L. Rnv. 547; Lufkin v. Jaama, 188 Xass. 528,
74 N. B. 933 (1905). An early New Jersey case held that, -where the grantee
agreed in writing to hold in trust, the trust would be enforced in spite of a
fraudulent purpose because there was an equitable estate vested in the
grantor which the court would respect. Ownes v Owncs 23 W. T. Eq. 60
(1872). But there -would seem to be a "vested equitable estate" even without
a written agreement in a resulting trust case; for the trust arises at the
moment of the transaction, if at all. Cf. Hgginbotzam i. Boggs, supra; see
Lord v. Reed, 254 ]11. 350, 358, 98 N. E. 553, 556 (1912). The refusal to
declare a resulting trust in the instant case penalizes the heirs for an
attempted "fraud" which apparently injured none and in which they had no
hand; while it rewards a grantee who may have aided in the fraudulent at-
tempt. Cf. Wigmore, Summary of Quasi Contracts (1891) 25 A. L. lnv.
695, 712 n.
WmIrrs AND ADMINISTRATION-CoNTINUATION or DECEDENT's Busnes BY
EXECUTOR op AmmxsTRAmOm.-The decedent in his will directed his execu-
trLx and his brother to continue his business for so long a time as, in their
opinion, it could be made profitable. A petition was brought by the execu-
trix praying that the will be construed to authorize her to continue the busi-
ness. Hel that, subject to certain legal responsibilities and limitations
upon her powers, the petitioner is authorized to continue the business for so
long as she and the testator's brother deem it profitable. In To Gorrao Wil,
135 Misc. 93, 236 N. Y. Supp. 709 (Surr. Ct. 1929).
It is well established that an executor or administrator has no inherent
power or authority to continue the business of the decedent. Willinger v.
German Bank of Baltimore, 132 Md. 237, 103 AtL 433 (1918) ; Succession of
Hawins, 139 La. 228, 71 So. 492 (1916). But such power may arise if con-
ferred in distinct and positive terms by the provisions of the will. WillHiS
v. Sharp, 113 X. Y. 586, 21 N. E. 705 (1889) ; cf. In rc Ennis' Estat, 9q
Wash. 352, 165 Pac. 119 (1917) (parol direction of decedent not sufficient)..
The continuation of the business may also be authorized by the probate
court. Fleming v KeU, 18 Colo. App. 23, 69 Pac. 272 (190.2) ; Smith v.
Smith, 105 S. C. 393, 89 S. E. 1032 (1916) (large number of contracts out-
standing). Contra: Alexander . Hering, 99 Mliss. 427, 55 So. 360 (1910).
This is frequently found necessary as an incident to winding up the estate.
Estate of Fernandez, 119 Cal. 579, 51 Pa. 851 (1898). The e.xecutbr or
administrator -who continues the business of the aecedent without authority
does so at his own peril and is not only personally responsible for 1ill ex-
penses and losses but must account to the estate for all profits. Martin
Bros. Co. -v. Peterson, 38.S. )1494, 162 N. W. 154 (1917) ; Schncbcrgcr t.
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•Frazer, 36 Idaho 737, 213 -Pac. 568 (1923) ; Riedy u. Bidwell, 70 Cal. App.
552, 233 Pac. 995 (1925). Where, however, the power is conferred either by
"testamentary provision or by court decree the executor or administrator
may use the fund already invested in the business and, although he remains
personally responsible to third parties, he may be indemnified from the
estate for responsibilities lawfully incurred within the scope of his powers.
Smith v. Smith; Willis v. harp, both supra. Yet the executor generally
cannot subject the estate to a direct responsibility to third parties. Estate
of DeRome, 175 Colo. 399, 165 Pac. 919 (1917); Succession of Huxon, 149
L.a. 61, 88 So. 687 (1921) ; Donnelly v. Alden, 229 Mass. 109, 118 N. E. 298
(1918) (mortgage on real estate given by executor to secure payment of
debts contracted by him held void); of. Thurmond v. Guyan. Valley Coal
Co., 85 W. Va. 501, 102 S. E. 221 (1920) (executor must sue in his own
name upon contracts into which he enters). There are special circumstances,
however, in which third parties may look directly to the assets of the estate.
Daniel v. Bank of West Point, 147 Ga. 695, 95 S. E. 255 (1918) (heirs
authorized executor to continue business and impliedly to bind the estate);
see Comment (1925)- 13 CALIF. L. Rnv. 495.
WIlS AND AD MINISTRATION-DISTRIBUTION OF PRALTY-ADjUSTMiaNT OF
LOCAL STATUTORY RATIOS TO COMPENSATE FOR DIFFERENT FOREIGN RATIOS.--
An executor brought an action in the state of the testatrix's domicile to de-
termine the amount to be set aside out of the estate of the testatrix by rea-'
son of the election of the surviving husband to take under a statute provid-
ing that the surviving spouse should be entitled to the use for life of one-
third in value of all the property owned by the other at death. The husband
contended that the third should be computed as of the total value of the real
property, foreign as well as local. Held, that the statute applies only to
realty in the jurisdiction. Banker's TrusT Co. of New York v. G"roims, 147
Atl. 290 (Conn. 1929).
The distribution of real property is said to be governed by the lox rci
sitae. See McGoon v. Scales, 9 Wall. 23, 27 (U. S. 1869) ; STOnY, CONFLICT
OF LAWS (6th ed. 1865) § 428. In various situations, however, courts are
in effect able to control to some extent the disposition of foreign realty.
Thus a court of equity may order the conveyance of foreign realty whether
or not the plaintiff has a claim against the specific land under the law of
the situs. Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch 148 (U. S. 1810); Meador v. Manlovo,
97 Kan. 706, 156 Pac. 731 (1916) ; Woodcock v. Barrick, 79 W. Va. 449,
91 S. E. 396 (1917). And a conveyance so ordered will be upheld by the
court of the situs. Steele v. Bryant, 132 Ky. 569, 116 S. W. 755 (1909).
Furthermore, the doctrine that an heir who accepts property in the state
of the situs against a will invalid under the law of the situs must com-
pensate the deprived devisee before he can take under the will in th6 juris-
diction of the testator's domicil also has the effect of controlling the ultimate
disposition of foreign realty. It re Laurence's Will, 93 Vt. 424, 108 Atl.
387 (1914).; In To Ogilvie, [1918] 1 Ch. 492. In ancillary administration
-some courts distribute real property within their jurisdictions so as in
effect to apply to the whole estate the quantitative ratios established by the
local statute governing distribution. Decker v. Vreeland, 220 N. Y. 326,
115 N. E. 989 (1917); In Tr Dwyers Estate, 159 Cal. 680, 115 Pac. 242
(1911)., The jurisdiction of last distribution is in a strategic position ef-
fectively to apply the local statutory ratio to the whole estate by adjusting
its decree to compensate for the ratios on which earlier foreign decrees
affdeting the foreign property of the decedent were based. Cf. In 're Dwyer's
F Estate, supra. Evidence of the actual foreign distribution or of the foreign
law dealing with distribution is admissible. Decker v. VT'ocland, supra. In
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view of the fact that the decree of the court of domicil in the principal case
is prior to ancillary administration, and that the court would have no con-
trol over subsequent foreign decrees, its refusal to apply the local ratio to
the entire estate seems proper.
WISSES--EXM= WIT ESSs--WHM ENTrTrLM TO EXTRA COM-_NSA-
TiON.-A brought an action for personal injuries against B, who employed
a physician to examine the nature and etent of A's injuries. Subpoenaed
by A, the physician then appeared before a notary public and answered
questions as to the facts of these injuries. He refused to give his opinion
as to their nature and extent without being paid additional compensation
as an expert witness. The lower court ordered him to answer the questions.
Held (four judges dissenting), that a writ seeking relief from the oz'der
be denied, on the ground that the physician had performed no special serv-
ices to entitle him to extra compensation since, although he had examined
A, he had done so at B's request. State of Washington -v. Superior Court,
281 Pac. 335 (Wash. 1929).
If an expert witness contracts for extra compensation, his contract is
upheld by the courts. People v. Montgomery, 13 Abb. Pr. (. s.) 207 (N. Y.
1872); Barrus v. Plzanef, 166 Mass. 123, 44 N. E. 141 (1896); Gordon .
Crey, 107 Me. 286, 78 At. 365 (1910). In a few jurisdictions statutes
provide for higher fees to expert witnesses than those paid to ordinary wit,-
nesses. Keller t. Harrison, 151 Iowa 320, 128 N. W. 851 (1910).; Egan -v.
Hotel Grunewald Co., 129 La. 163, 55 So. 750 (1911). In the absence of an
express contract or a statute, the weight of authority is against granting
such fees to expert witnesse for their testimony alone. Ez parte Dem-nt,
53 Ala. 389 (1875); Pziller v. Waukesha. County, 139 Wis. 211, 120 X. W.
829 (1909); Ulacsi -v. Morris and Co., 106 Neb. 782, 184 X. W. 946 (1921).
Contra: Buchman v. State, 59 Ind. 1 (1877). But if the witness has per-
formed special additional services to qualify himself to testify in the par-
ticular case, he is granted reasonable compensation for such services. Plinn
v. Prairie County, 60 Ark. 204, 29 S. W. 459 (1895) ; Pcople -v. Carte, 17 Cal.
App. 771, 122 Pac. 450 (1912); Birch, v. Sees, 1'78 App. Div. 609, 165 N. Y.
Supp. 846 (2d Dep't 1917) ; Klepper v. Klepper, 199 Mo. App. 294, 202 S. W.
593 (1918). In the instant case the examination by the plaintiff was made in
the course of his employment by a third party; he had in no sense per-
formed it in order to qualify himself as an expert witness on behalf of the
party he had examined. The examination was therefore properly held not
to be a special service that would entitle him to extra compensation. Cf.
Summs v. State, 5 Tex. App. 365 (1879).
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